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Compared with other texts in the field of statistics, which attempt to cover 
the same material  at  a relatively simple level, this book is refreshing. I t  repre- 
sents an honest effort to convey a true, workable understanding of statistics 
ra ther  than simply providing a number of computational methods which can 
be applied. While teaching statistics to students of psychology will continue, I 
fear ,  to be a difficult problem, a text  such as this, which stresses understand- 
ing of statistical techniques, their  meaning and limitations, and the theory be- 
hind them, should help in get t ing across much that  will he valuable to the 
student. 
As one would find in any book on statistics writ ten at  this level, and writ- 
ten by one person, there are inadequacies here and there. Most people, I sus- 
pect, will find the last chapter on sampling and statistical inference incom- 
plete, inexact, and relatively useless. The book might have been a better book 
without this last chapter which, unfortunately,  introduces several confusions. 
Other inadequacies are mostly of the character of omissions in explanation. 
I shall select a few examples of these to i l lustrate the type of thing involved: 
(1) On page 64, in discussing the sampling distribution of differences be- 
tween means, the author states,- " I t  will be noticed that  we can have a corre- 
lational term in formula (26) only when it is possible to pair, on some basis 
other than Chance, the scores which enter  into the first mean with the scores 
which contribute to the second mean." The formula involved is the standard 
deviation of a distribution of differences between means. The author manages 
successfully to convey the impression tha t  the correlation term exists theo- 
retically only if one can compute it  in practice. This is, of course, not true. 
There are many instances where correlation can exist between the means, but 
this correlation cannot be estimated from the sample. The student should know 
that, even though he cannot estimate the correlation and assumes it  to be 
zero, he may be in error  in so doing. 
(2) On page 98, in summarizing his conclusions af ter  a discussion of 
rank order correlation, the author states "Rho is not as consistent from sample 
to sample as z ,  does not possess the mathematical advantages inherent in r ,  and 
therefore has merit  only when the observations involve ranks, i.e., are not meas- 
ures." I t  is somewhat surprising that  the author, who is clearly sensitive to 
problems of statistical inference and testing, and who is concerned with limi- 
tations and inadequacies involved in making the necessary assumptions about 
the tests employed, can ignore the important  role of rho in being amenable to 
exact tests of  significance which do not involve assumptions concerning the par-  
ent  population. This use of rank order correlation has been developed and used. 
I t  is too bad for a book of this caliber to dismiss an excellent technique so sum- 
marily. 
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(3) On page 166, discussing limitations of the product moment correla- 
tion, the author says, "The product moment correlation . . . . .  needs careful 
qualifying if either or both variables yield skewed distributions." And in the 
next paragraph he says, "There are no general rules to follow in the case of 
variables yielding skewed distributions. Frequently,  one can use a logarithmic 
transformation of such a variable and thereby secure scores which are at least 
approximately normal;  or one may deliberately normalize the distribution by 
converting the raw scores into T scores." I t  is never made clear by the author 
just how or why the product moment correlation needs careful qualifying if 
we have skewed distributions, and it is certainly not madeclear how we are 
helped by such a dubious procedure as normalizing the distributions involved. 
It is common knowledge that the calculation of a product moment correlation 
involves no assumptions whatsoever concerning the normality of the variables 
involved and that interpretation of the correlation coefficient can be made un- 
equivocally in terms of a best fitting straight line irrespective of the distribu- 
tion functions. It is true, of course, that to the extent that we do not have a 
normal correlation surface, we are at somewhat of a loss in testing significance 
of correlations. This latter point, however, is certainly not helped by delib- 
erately normalizing the distribution. It is not clear what the author has in 
mind or why he makes the recommendation. 
It should be stressed, however, that such points as these might not even 
be points of criticism were the book otherwise not on such a good level of ex- 
planation. I would like to devote the rest of this review to a discussion of two 
basic questions which this book ,brings up about the relationship between sta- 
tistics and psychology. 
The basic place of statistics in relation to any science or any body of data 
is as a tool or as a servant. Statistics does not dictate to the science, but rather 
seeks to adapt itself and to develop so as to help the science. In psychology 
today we are in danger of losing this nice relationship with statistics. Sta- 
tistics has in many ways been oversold to psychologists and is rapidly becom- 
ing a tyrant, inflexible and nonadaptive. There are two major aspects of this 
trend toward statistical tyranny, both of which show themselves well in Mc- 
Nemar's book. One of these concerns the question of what is and what is not 
significant statistically, and the other concerns the question of the value placed 
upon high-powered statistical techniques in themselves, rather than in relation 
to the data on which they are used. We shall discuss these two points in order. 
(1) The level of significance Co insist upon: 
Fifteen years ago statistics textbooks that  were used in connection with 
psychology tended to make the simple and ra ther  dogmatic statement that  a 
critical ratio of 3.0 was needed in order for  a difference to be regarded as sig- 
nificant. Later  when R. A. Fisher  made his considerable impact upon statistics 
and statistical thinking, this was modified in most textbooks to permit the in- 
vest igator  to also consider P values of .05 and .01 as evidence for regarding a 
difference as significant. 
I t  has always been said that  the part icular  P value upon which an inves- 
t igator  insists is an arb i t ra ry  matter .  This, however, has not prevented dogma 
in relation to the selection of  a P value. When the notion was introduced into 
statistics of two types of errors, namely, accepting the null hypothesis when 
false and rejecting the null hypothesis when true, the reasoning behind the 
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selection of wha t  P value  to insist  upon became more sophist icated but  the  rec- 
ommendat ions  of  wr i t e r s  stil l  r emained  fa i r ly  dogmatic.  I n  most  cases the tea-  
sorting w e n t  something  like th i s :  The re  a re  two types  of  possible e r ro r s  and 
the  inves t iga to r  mus t  choose his P level according to the  re la t ive  impor tance  
he  places upon these  two kinds of  er rors ,  but  never theless  one should ins is t  upon a 
h igh  level  of  confidence fo r  r e j ec t ing  the null  hypothesis .  This  type  of sophis- 
t icated non  sequitu~" is v e r y  well i l lus t ra ted  in McNemar ' s  book. A f t e r  a ve ry  
cxc~ilent discussion of  the two types of errors ,  McNemar  concludes on page 67" 
A t  the o ther  ext reme,  a few are  wi l l ing to accept  as s ignif icant  a 
difference which is 1.5 t imes  its s tandard  error .  Since P ~ .13 fo r  a CR 
of 1.5, i t  is readi ly  seen tha t  such persons wou-l-d" all too f requent ly  
have  the i r  publics bel ieving t h a t  chance differences a re  real.  A less 
lax  level, which has  had genera l  acceptance by some workers ,  is repre-  
sented by a P of  .05, o r  a C R  of near ly  2.0. This  is also a r a the r  low 
level of  significance for  announcing  someth ing  as " f ac t . "  Those wr i t e r s  
who advocate  the .05 level for  research workers  in psychology, soci- 
ology, and educat ion cite R. A. F isher ,  the wor ld ' s  leading s ta t i s t ic ian ,  
as  the i r  author i ty ,  but  they  fa i l  to point  out  t ha t  F i she r ' s  applicat ions 
are  to exper imenta l  s i tuat ions  where in  the re  is f a r  be t ter  control of 
sampl ing  than  is ord inar i ly  the case in the social sciences. 
In  short ,  a f t e r  discussing the two types of er rors ,  McNemar  seems content  to 
base his conclusions about  P values  on only one of  those types of errors .  He 
seems to r e g a r d  o n l y  the re jec t ion  of t h e ' n u l l  hypothesis  as  "announc ing  some- 
th ing  as f a c t "  and does not  seem to feel tha t  accept ing the null hypothesis  is 
also announc ing  someth ing  as  fact .  I f  there  is something  in between re jec t ing  
the  nul l  hypothesis  and accept ing  the  nul l  hypothesis ,  M c N e m a r  fa i l s  to point  
ou t  w h a t  th is  t h i r d  a l t e rna t ive  is. He  also fa i l s  to suppol~ the somewhat  spe- 
cious reason ing  tha t  a lower level  of  significance is appropr i a t e  to exper imen-  
ta l  s i tuat ions.  
McNemar  also s ta tes  on page 69, " I f  some reader  mus t  have a cr i ter ion re- 
ga rd ing  wha t  is or  is not  significant,  the  au thor  suggests  tha t  he compromise 
by t ak ing  the  level  indicated by a P of .01." Aga in  in the  midst  of an excellent  
discussion concerning the kinds of  e r ro rs  of  s ta t is t ical  inference tha t  a re  in- 
volved, the  conclusion is d rawn  t h a t  one mus t  have a v e r y  high level of confi- 
dence f o r  r e j ec t ing  the  null  hypothesis .  This ,  morever ,  does not  express  all  of 
M c N e m a r ' s  opinions on the mat te r .  On page  233, in discussing small  sample  
methods,  we find the  fo l lowing in te res t ing  s t a t emen t :  " I t  seems to us tha t  those 
who publish s ta t is t ical  resul t s  based on a small  n u m b e r  of cases should, unless  
they  a re  posi t ively sure  t h a t  the basic assumpt ions  under ly ing  it  have .been met  
(and this  assurance  can seldom be a t t a ined) ,  adopt  a more s t r ingen t  level of  
significance, says  a P of .001 before  d rawing  definite conclusions, and a P of  
.01 as the border l ine  of  significance, i.e., as sugges t ive ."  
Let  us examine  whe ther  such recommendat ions  and such opinions a re  val id  
conclusions f r o m  the a r g u m e n t s  which a re  and can be made,  or  whe the r  these 
opinions and conclusions s tem r a t h e r  f rom prejudices .  The  tabula t ion  below pre-  
sents  an  example  of  how f requen t ly  the e r ro r  of  accept ing  the  null hypothesis ,  
wi th  a specified t rue  difference exis t ing,  would occur  wi th  different  numbers  of  
cases in the  samples  and specified P va lues  fo r  r e j ec t ing  the  null hypothesis .  
The example  presupposes  a t rue  difference of  + 5  and a s tandard  deviat ion of  
differences equal  to 10. 
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Proportion of Time Null Hypothesis Would Be Accepted 
Difference between Means is 5.0 and a ~-- 10 
Where True 
P Value Required for Rejecting 
Number of Null  Hypothesis 
Cases ¢ .003 .01 .05 .13 
M1-Ms 
9 3.33 .95 .84 .69 .50 
25 2.00 .69 .50 .31 .16 
49 1.43 .24 .08 .02 .002 
100 1.00 .05 ~1 .003 .0002 
I t  can be seen t h a t f o r  small numbers of cases, if  a t rue difference exists, 
there would be a tremendous number of errors committed by insisting upon a 
high level of confidence for rejecting the null hypothesis. Thus, in this exam- 
ple, with an ~t of 25, if  we insisted upon the 5% level of confidence, 31% of the 
time we would accept the null hypothesis erroneously. Only with a relatively 
large number of cases can one set a hig h level of confidence for  rejecting the 
null hypothesis and also be reasonably sure tha t  he will not be committing a 
large number of errors of the other type. 
If, then, in some instance both types of errors were equally important, our 
choice of level of significance for rejecting the null hypothesis would tend to be 
very different from what is customarily employed in psychology today, and radi- 
cally different from what is recommended by M~Nemar. In fact, we would come 
to one conclusion exactly contradictory to McNemar. He suggests that  the small- 
er the number of cases the higher the level of confidence we should insist on 
before rejecting the null hypothesis. From the example in our tabulation we 
would, however, tend to conclude that  this would great ly magnify the number 
of errors of the other type which we would make. I t  is probably more reason- 
able to insist upon less confidence in reject ing the null hypothesis when the num- 
ber of cases is small. The cri teria for rejecting the null hypothesis can become 
stricter  and stricter as our number of cases increase. In an a ~ ' /o~/sense,  one 
should not expect as much confidence from small samples as from large ones. 
I t  is important  to realize that  a conclusion of no difference is frequently as 
important  as concluding that  there is a difference. Both of these types of con- 
clusions can have equal implications for action. I t  is consequently important to 
choose a level of confidence which tends to minimize both kinds of errors ra ther  
than maximize one kind of error  while minimizing another. Statistics must be 
looked at  as a help in understanding and interpret ing our data ra ther  than as 
a determiner of specified standards of a statistical nature which should be met. 
(2) The sel/-pe~pe~uating character of statistical techniques: 
I t  is unfortunate for  psychology and for  psychologists tha t  very few of the 
commonly used statistical techniques have been developed in connection with 
the practical problems of analyzing psychological data. The result  is that  ex- 
cellent statistical techniques whose assumptions are geared to conditions of data 
in other fields are now used in psychology. The at tempt is made to force the 
design of  psychological experiments into the required pat tern  which would then 
make them amenable to t reatment  by these statistical techniques. The question 
is rare ly  raised of the efficiency of these designs and of these statistical tech- 
niques for  the problems involved in psychology. McNemar, in spite of his ex- 
cellent t reatment  of the conventional statistical techniques, is a good example of  
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an author paying much attention to the requirements of the statistics and rela- 
tively little attention to the requirements of the data which the psychologist is 
interested in gathering. This omission is made even more glaring because the 
book is entitled Psychological Statistics, carrying the implication that  it  is for 
the psychologist. 
Thus, in the book we find little attention being given to such techniques as 
rank order correlation, tests of significance based on rank orders and serial or- 
ders, and other such devices which can be of great help in many kinds of psy- 
chological data. Nowhere in the book can one find an attempt to teach the stu- 
dent how to use elementary probability theory in connection with his data. 
There is no elaboration of such simple devices as, for example, six independent 
differences in the same direction being significant at  the 3% level of confidence, 
or a predicted order of five quantities being significant at  the 1% level in terms 
of the possible permutations that  could have occurred. Knowledge and use of 
such simple devices, however, is more important  in many fields of psychology 
than complicated techniques such as analysis of covariance, to which the author 
does devote considerable time. 
There is altogether no attempt to search the statistical literature for tech- 
niques and devices which are suitable for the peculiar conditions of psychological 
data. On the contrary, the book is merely an excellent presentation of statis- 
tical techniques which are best applicable to other fields than psychology. The 
discussions of the use of chi-square and of analysis of variance, for example, 
are the standard kinds of presentation for use where the experimental varia- 
tions do not form a continuum. So frequently in psychology, experimental 
groups do fall along a graded continuum and nowhere in McNemar's book will 
one find the statement that  ehi-square and analysis of variance are inefficient 
techniques when the experimental groups are degrees of variation along a con- 
t inuum since these techniques ignore the ordering of the results. I t  will have 
to be from books other than this one that  psychologists will be able to learn to 
use statistics as a flexible tool ra ther  than submit to statistics as a rigid master. 
University of Michigan. LEON FF.STING~g 
On Festinger 's  Review of Psychological Statistics 
Natural ly I applaud certain parts  of Fest inger 's  review and I find sugges- 
tions therein that  are worth filing for a possible revision of the book. But I also 
find points of fact and of philosophy with which I disagree. Of course I can say 
nothing to the nonparticularized criticism that the last chapter is "incomplete, 
inexact, and relatively useless," and that it "introduces several confusions." 
A word on Festinger's third illustration of inadequacies. His implication 
that I think normality of distribution is assumed for ~ is controverted by my 
statement on p. 113, "~ does not assume normal distributions." He also evi- 
dently missed my reasons, stated on the same page, for injecting a word of cau- 
tion when nonnormal distributions are involved. My suggestion that distribu- 
tions be normalized by transformation is said to be a "dubious proeedure"--per- 
haps as a strong advocate of rank correlation the reviewer would prefer to 
rectangularize the distributions. He states that the testing of the significance 
of correlation "is certainly not helped by deliberately normalizing the distribu- 
tion." Regarding this generalization, we refer the reader to the article and 
bibliography of M~eller (Psychol. Bull., 1949, 46, 198-223). 
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Readers will have noted that  Fest inger uses a large portion of the review 
to expound his own ideas on statistics in psychology. He seems to be worried 
about statistics being "oversold" to psychologists, "becoming a tyrant ,  inflexible 
and nonadaptive," a "rigid master." I am indicted for aiding and abetting this 
"trend toward statistical tyranny."  
In  partial  support of the above apprehensions, one-half the review is de- 
voted to alleged dogma concerning what is significant statistically. Anyone who 
reads pages 66-69 and 232-234 may judge for himself whether the exposition 
is "dogmatic" and "prejudiced" or whether Festinger 's  discussion, and his use 
of quotations out of context, misrepresent these pages. Furthermore, there are 
points in his argument  which demand comment. 
When he says that  "accepting the null hypothesis is also announcing some- 
thing as fact," we ask what kind of fact emerges except the trivial fact that  
the null hypothesis couldn't be rejected. When he says that  it  is " important  
to choose a level of confidence which tends to minimize both kinds of errors," 
we ask whether there is a method for doing this. A search of the l i terature 
indicates that  this problem has not been solved. (An-outs tanding mathematical 
statistician informs me that  simultaneous minimization of the two types of er- 
rors is simply impossible.) 
When the reviewer supposedly shows by a cleverly devised example that  
my expressed lack of fai th in small samples is ill-founded, he unwitt ingly pro- 
vides an excellent i l lustration of my claim that  small samples are not condu- 
cive to rejection of the null hypothesis. Moreover, he does not, and for reasons 
which will soon be obvious, carry his own argument  to its logical conclusion. 
Suppose that  instead of a t rue difference of ~ 5  it is presumed that  the true 
difference is ~1 .  Then with an N of 25 and the .05 level for significance, one 
would erroneously accept the null  hypothesis 93% of the time. Now to over- 
come this sad state of affairs, let us follow the reviewer's suggestion of using 
a less s tr ingent  level of significance. A little arithmetic shows that  even to 
reduce the 93% to 50% would entail using a cr i t ic~ ratio of only .5, or a P 
level of about .62, for rejecting the null  hypothesis! 
Being ever aware that  statistical inference is a par t  of the logic of scien- 
tific method and being always wary of the use of any "flexible" logic, I regard 
Festinger 's  concluding sentence as a compliment. Submitt ing to statistics as 
a "rigid master" involves nothing more than submitt ing to the rigors of scien- 
tific method. 
Stanford University QUINN MCNEMAR 
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